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The Insanity Verdict, The Psychopath,
And Post-Acquittal Confinement

Abraham L. Halpern*

INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years I have criticized the insanity defense
on the grounds that, rather than uplifting the law's moral character,
it makes a mockery of the criminal justice system; that its practical
application is frequently harmful to the population it is intended to
benefit; and that it undermines the processes of the law and
tarnishes the public sense of justice.' In this paper, I shall focus on
the successful use of the insanity defense by a defendant which
results, in many instances, either in the hospitalization of the
acquittee in overcrowded and chronically understaffed institutions
or in his incarceration in prison. In the event that the acquittee
following his institutionalization is found not to be mentally ill or

*

Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, New York Medical College; M.D., University of Toronto,

1952.
1. See Abraham Halpern, Statement ConcerningElimination of the Insanity Rule, Remarks
before the New York State Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code
(Syracuse, N.Y. Nov. 18, 1964); Halpern, The Insanity Defense: A Juridical Anachronism, 7
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 41 (1977); Halpem, The Fiction of Legal Insanity and the Misuse of
Psychiatry, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 18 (1980); Halpern, Reconsideration of the Insanity Defense and
Related Issues in the Aftermath of the Hinckley Trial, 54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 260 (1982); Halpern,
Statement on the Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Senate Jud. Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
283-403, 427-28 (July 19, 28 & Aug. 2, 4, 1982); Halpem, Elimination of the Exculpatory Insanity
Rule: A Modern Societal Need, in 6 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA: FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 611 (Robert L. Sadoff ed. 1983); Halpern, FurtherComments on the Insanity Defense
in the Aftermath of the Hinckley Trial, 56 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 62 (1984); Halpern, The AMA Report on
the Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials, 56 PsYcHIATRIC Q. 236 (1984); Halpern, A Formulafor
Sane Procedures Following Acquittal By Reason of Insanity, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 93 (Richard Rosner et al. eds., 1989); Halpem, Abolition of the Insanity
Defense in Victoria, in EMERGING ISSuEs OF THE 1990s IN PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND
ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 29 (1989); Halpem, The Insanity Defense in
the 21st Century 35 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 187, 187 (1991).
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recovers sufficiently to warrant release on clinical grounds, timeconsuming hearings (often delayed) are generally required to gain

the acquittee's release. These proceedings frequently result in
continued retention because of the reluctance of both psychiatric

and judicial decisionmakers to approve a release.2 This Article
argues that the post-acquittal confinement process inevitably
precipitates the misuse and abuse of psychiatry and psychology.
Strangely, the ability of prosecutors and judges to abuse this
process is, arguably, the reason for the continued vitality of the
insanity defense in America.

As will be shown, legislators and judges, from the time that the
"Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity" (hereinafter NGRI) verdict was
specifically enacted into law, vested in nontreatment officials the
power and authority to release acquittees from confinement.
Believing that the NGRI verdict was a humanitarian disposition
which permitted medical treatment of mentally ill offenders and

thus saved them from severe punishment, including death for the
more serious crimes, mental health professionals hailed the NGRI
verdict as a mark of an advanced criminology. Astonishingly, this
view persists in the minds of many, even after almost two centuries
of misuse of psychiatric evidence. This misuse has transformed

insanity, originally considered synonymous with mental illness, into

a strictly legal term, not a medical one.4 Furthermore, the

2. A more rational handling of the mentally disordered offender, which does not invoke an
exculpatory insanity rule is needed. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
3.
See infra notes 30-71 and accompanying text. As I have previously commented:
The APA Statement proposed that release from confimement of acquittees who had
committed a violent act should occur only if comprehensive (and necessarily expensive)
aftercare community programs were in place, literally guaranteeing that few such
individuals would, in fact, be released. The decision to release acquittees would rest in the
hands of a board which, although including a psychiatrist, consisted mainly of other
professionals representing the criminal justice system-akin to a parole board-an
'experienced body' that, presumably unlike psychiatrists, is 'not naive about the nature
of violent behavior committed by mental patients and that allows a quasi-criminal
approach for managing such persons.'
Abraham Halpern, The Politics of the Insanity Defense, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 3, 6
(1993).
4.
See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("What
psychiatrists may consider a 'mental disease or defect' for clinical purposes, where their concern is
treatment, may or may not be the same for the jury's purpose in determining criminal
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determination of acquittee dangerousness became a prerogative of
judges, not mental health professionals, on the grounds that
dangerousness was ultimately a legal, not a medical, decision.5 For
decades courts were able to disguise the punitive nature of postacquittal confinement by paying lip service to "the assistance which
medical testimony may provide" in the determination of
dangerousness.'
This Article will analyze the current status of post-acquittal
confinement law in America as well as suggest much needed
reforms in this area. Section I will trace the development of the
insanity plea from its origins in early England. Section II describes
the birth of the NGRI plea in the celebrated English case of Rex v.
Hadfield.7 In Section III, this Article will explore post-acquittal
confinement in the United States. Particular emphasis will be
placed on evaluating the various tests employed by courts to assess
an individual's "legal sanity." Section IV discusses the impact of
recent developments, including federal legislation, on the current
status of the insanity defense. The Article, in Section V, will
review several examples of the misuse of psychiatry in the postacquittal confinement process. The impact of the recent Supreme
Court case of State v. Fouchaon a state's ability to institutionalize
a defendant subsequent to acquittal will be explained in Section VI.
Section VII discusses the punitive rationale underlying the
utilization of a split verdict, whereby an individual may be found
guilty of one crime as well as not guilty by reason of insanity of
another related offense. Based on the abuses and misuses of
psychiatry inherent in the process, this Article will conclude by
recommending the abolishment of the insanity plea as well as
reforms to the post-acquittal confinement process.

responsibility.").

5.

See, e.g., State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 296 (NJ. 1975) (stating that the trier of fact will

make the determination as to whether the defendant falls within the legal definition of insanity).

6.

Il at 302.

7.

27 Haw. St. Tr. 1281 (1800).
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I. OUTRIGHT AcQUHrAL OF THE MENTALLY
ILL OFFENDER

Whence came automatic post-acquittal confinement? For about
one and a half centuries prior to 1800, whenever insanity was
considered serious enough to merit exculpation, the verdict was
outright acquittal! Although compassion for the mentally ill or
mentally retarded offender was recommended even in Talmudic
times,9 and some commentators argue that the insanity defense has
been in existence since at least the twelfth century,"° it was not,
however, until the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), that the insanity
defense was established as an excuse for crime." During the reign
of Edward II (1307-1321), a further shift towards recognizing
insanity as a complete defense occurred, which was perfected by
the time of the ascension of Edward III to the throne (13261327).12 The first documented case of a "jury acquittal on grounds
of unsound mind" is said to have occurred in 1505,13 and other
examples of similar acquittals can be found up through the
eighteenth century.' 4

8. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 392-93 (1925) (noting
that: "[b]efore 1800, in England, and in most jurisdictions in this country, if an accused person was
found to be irresponsible by reason of insanity he was forthwith acquitted, and no special order
looking to his safety or that of society was made").
9. Jacques Quen, An Historical Kew of the M'Naghten Trial,42 Bull HisT. MED. 42, 43
(1968) (quoting the Babylonian Talmud: "A deaf-mute, an Idiot, and a minor are awkward to deal
with, and he who injures them is liable, whereas, if they injure others they are exempt.").
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL PEuRLN, 3 MENTAL DISABIIrTY LAW-CviL AND CRIMINAL 283 n.28
(1989) (discussing 2 HENRI DE BRACTON, DE Laomus Er CONSUETUDINIBUS ANoLIAE 425
(Longman, Thome trans. 1968)).
11. See, e.g., State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914,928 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (citing
3 WILAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 371 (1908)); SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1927); JOHN BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 83 (1955).
12. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 928.
13. See, e.g., Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31
EMORY LJ. 9 (1982) (quoted in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION STATEMENT ON THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 2 (1982)); RITA SIMON & DAvI AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 10 (1988).
14. See generally MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 36 (1736).
The 1668 acquittal of the defendant in one of Sir Matthew Hale's trials vividly portrays the sympathy
shown by English juries in truly deserving cases:
In the year 1668 at Aylesbury a married woman of good reputation being delivered of a
child, and having not slept many nights fell into a temporary phrenzy, and kild her infant
in the absence of any company; but, company coming in, she told them, she had kild her
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Prior to the seventeenth century, however, insanity did not save
the offender's property from being forfeited to the crown. "It was
then the practice not to acquit an accused person on the ground of
insanity but to render, together with a verdict of guilty, a special
verdict of insanity, which was invariably followed by the king's
pardon.' 5 Until 1800, mentally disordered offenders considered
dangerous were not likely to be acquitted under the early insanity
tests, which required an extreme degree of impairment to be
demonstrated before exculpation could be considered. 6 With the
commencement of the eighteenth century, the ability of even non-

infant, and there it lay; she was brought to gaol presently, and after some sleep she
recovered her understanding, but marvelled how or why she came tither, she was indicted
for murder, and upon her trial the whole matter appearing it was left to the jury with this
direction, that if it did appear, that she had any use of reason why she did it, they were
to find her guilty; but if they found her under a phrenzy, tho by reason of her late delivery
and want to sleep, they should acquit her, that had there been any occasion to move her
to this fact, as to hide her shame, which is ordinarily the case of such as are delivered of
bastard children and destroy them; or if there had been jealousy in her husband, that the
child had been none of his, or she had hid the infant, or denied the fact, these had been
evidences, that the phrenzy was counterfeit; but none of these appearing, and the honesty
and virtuous deportment of the woman in her health being known to the jury, and many
circumstances of insanity appearing, the jury found her not guilty to the satisfaction of all
that heard it.
15.
ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 390 (1937).
16.
See, e.g., JOHN BioGs, THE GUILTY MIND 83-84 (1955) (quoting WILLIAM LAMBARDF,
EIRENARCiiA OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (1581) ("If a madman or a natural
fool, or a lunatic in the time of his lunacy, or a child that apparently hath no knowledge of good nor
evil do kill a man, this is no felonious act, nor anything forfeited by it ... for they cannot be said
to have an understanding will."); see also MAT'HEv HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAs OF THE
CROWN 14-15 (1736) ("he consent of the will is that which renders human actions either
commendable or culpable... [a]nd because the liberty or choice of the will presupposeth an act of
the understanding to know the thing or action chosen by the will, it follows that, where there is a
total defect of the understanding, there is not free act of the will in the choice of things or actions").
Hale was troubled by the fact that some persons, who are "under a partial dementia in respect of
some particular discourses" are melancholy and "for the most part discover their defect in excessive
fears and griefs" are "not yet wholly destitute of the use of reason" and may be entitled to some
consideration on that account. a at 30. He arrived at a compromise standard for criminal
responsibility: "Such a person as labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordinarily as great
understanding as ordinarily a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as may be guilty of
treason or felony." Id; see also Arnold's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724) ("If the man be
deprived of his reason, and consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty ... It is not every kind
of frantic humour or something accountable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a
madman as is to be exempted from punishment; it must be a man that is totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a
brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment" (emphasis added)).
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dangerous offenders to gain acquittal due to their mental condition
began to erode.
II. NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY

Outright acquittal went out the window in 1800 at the
celebrated trial of James Hadfield. 7 Hadfield, believing that he
had been ordained by God to undergo self-sacrifice for the
salvation of the world, fired a shot at King George Ill in a London
theater. His lawyer was Thomas Erskine, a brilliant
extemporaneous speaker. Were it not for the fact that the charge
was treason inasmuch as the shot was directed at the King, full
acquittal might readily have resulted."8 Hadfield was clearly
psychotic at the time of the trial, and numerous witnesses attested
to Hadfield's deranged mind.' 9 Further, it was established by
physicians at the trial that the derangement was caused by brain
damage sustained in a battle in France six years earlier.2" Erskine,
however, was not taking any chances: Since Hadfield was able to
distinguish between good and evil (that is, right and wrong), the
insanity test then prevailing, it was necessary to devise a new test
to ensure that a verdict of acquittal would be rendered. 2' Erskine,
therefore, developed a position based on the testimony of the
physicians during the trial.22 Erskine's new test moved away from

17. Rex v. Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1307 (1800).
18. Id The King, after all, had not been wounded; it was apparently not the intention of the
defendant, an ex-soldier and expert shot, to kill the King, but simply to commit treason by shooting
at him.
19. Id See generally Jacques Quen, James Hadfieldand MedicalJurisprudenceof Insanity,
69 N.Y. ST. 1. MED. 1221, 1223 (1969) (discussing the effects of the Hadfield case.)
20. Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. at 1307. His past patriotism and devotion to duty were
impressed upon the jury by Erskine, who topped off his case by having the jury look closely at the
extensive and deep scars about Hadfield's head and neck. Id; see NtEL WALKER, I CRIME AND
INSANITY INENGLAND 74 (1968) (discussing the Hadfield trial); ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH &
LAw: A SYsTEM INTRANSrrION 219 (1976) (according to one writer, Erskine also had the jury feel

Hadfield's exposed brain).
21. See supra notes 6-14.
22.

Quen, supra note 19, at 1223; see also LAuRENCE TANCREDI Lrr AL, LEGAL IsSUES IN

PsYcIATRic CARE 2 (1975) (discussing the history of psychology and the law); Thomas Szasz,
Psychiatry,Ethics andthe CriminalLaw, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 183, 191 (1958) (Like the psychiatrists
in present-day insanity trials, the physicians were "equipped to formulate a more sophisticated and
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the traditional "wild beast" view of insanity. The defense counsel
explained that the insane "have not only had the most perfect
knowledge and recollection of all relations they have stood in
towards others, and of the acts and circumstances of their lives, but
have, in general, been remarkable for their subtlety and acuteness - delusion where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true
character of insanity."23 This new test would ensure that the jury
would not appear to look favorably upon a treasonable act. It
would also demonstrate that not merely sympathy for the accused,
but adherence to the rule of law guided the jury in its decision.
Thus, the physician's explanation, given the stamp of acceptance
because of its scientific flavor, became an important underpinning

of the jury's verdict.24 At the request of a member of the
prosecution team, the jury added the clause "he being under the
influence of insanity at the time the act was committed" to its

finding of "not guilty." 5 Thus was born the verdict of "not guilty
by reason of insanity."
Within a month of Hadfield's trial, the Criminal Lunatics Act
of 180026 was hurriedly passed, under which virtually all persons
acquitted by the court on the ground of insanity (or found to be
insane on arraignment) could be ordered to be detained in close

necessarily more complicated theory than the layman.").
23. Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. at 22.
24. Quen, supra note 19, at 1307. Erskine, thereupon, with hypnotic eloquence, proceeded to
give the jury the legal and medical logic they were looking for:
Delusion, where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of insanity; and
where it cannot be predicated of a man standing for life or death of a crime, he ought not,
in my opinion, to be acquitted . . .I must convince you, not only that the unhappy
prisoner was a lunatic, within my own definition of lunacy, but the act was the immediate,
unqualified offspring of the disease... [Tio deliver a lunatic from responsibility to
criminal justice.... the relation between the disease and the act should be apparent.
Where the connection is doubtful, the judgment should certainly be most indulgent, from
the great difficulty of diving into the secret sources of a disordered mind.
Id.
25. Il at 1356.
26. Criminal Lunatics Act, 40 George 3, c.94 (1800), quoted in, Note, Compulsory
Commitment Followinga Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U. L. REV.409,409 (1961) ( J]pon
the trial of any person charged with treason, murder or felony... if they shall find such person was
insane at the time of committing such offence, the court before whom such trial shall be had, shall
order such person to be kept in strict custody, until His Majesty's pleasure shall be known..
").
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custody "until His Majesty's Pleasure be known."'2 7 The place of
detention under strict custody was not specified, and, although
Hadfield himself was confined in Bethlem Hospital (under
conditions worse than prison), "most criminal lunatics remained in
gaol"28 in the early 1800's. It was not until 1814, that separate
wards were built on to Bethlem Hospital for the confinement of
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity under the Criminal
Lunatics Acts.29 American courts were influenced by their English
counterpart's treatment of individuals found not guilty by reason of
insanity. From its origin in Rex v. Hadfield," post-acquittal
confinement has evolved into a distinctly American creature.
II. POST-ACQUrITAL CONFINEMENT
In the United States, over subsequent decades, persons acquitted
by reason of insanity were housed in maximum security
institutions, frequently prisons.31 Currently, mandatory postacquittal confinement continues to be accepted by judges and
lawmakers as a reasonable step on the basis of the presumption of
continuing insanity.3 2 The punitive aspects, however, of such a

27. RALPH PARTRIDoE, BROADMOOR 1 (1953). Partridge explained:
Ordinary lunatics at that time were sent to Bethlem Hospital, where the supervision was
not particularly strict; and if Hadfield were to escape he would probably take another shot

at the King. On the other hand, lunatics who had participated in crime were confined in

gaol, but without any legal justification, for inthe eye of the law the insane ought to be
treated as innocent. It was high time to rectify this dubious method of detention.
Id.
28.

RoGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS

23 (1981). "Gaol" is an old English term for jail. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (6th ed. 1990).
29. PARTRIDrE, supra note 27, at 2.
30. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (discussing Rex v. Hadfield).
31. See, e.g., State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 402, 429 (1870) (defining the "product test" and
allowing the defendant an acquittal by virtue of NGRI if "the killing was the ... product of mental
disease in the defendant"); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 381 (1871) (construing Gen. St. 494 and
ruling that -[i]f the verdict be 'not guilty by reason of insanity,' the prisoner does not go free, but
it is the duty of the court to commit him to the asylum or prison for safe keeping").
32. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983) (finding of insanity at criminal
trial was sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment of the
accused on the grounds of insanity, in that it was not unreasonable for Congress to determine that

person who has been found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed a criminal act, indicates
dangerousness and an insanity acquittal supported an inference of continuing mental illness).
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presumption and the susceptibility to misuse of psychiatry can
readily be seen when acquittees who have been on bail for
extended periods, and who are no longer in the mental state which
existed at the time of the criminal act that led to the finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity, are automatically remanded to a
maximum security psychiatric hospital.
An illustrative case is that of Martin Henig 3 Here, the
defendant, who fatally stabbed his girlfriend in January 1970, was
found mentally incompetent to stand trial and was placed in a
mental institution. 4 He was declared fit to proceed in March
1973, was released on bail in June 1973 pending trial, and
subsequently underwent intensive psychotherapy.35 He was
acquitted by reason of insanity in November 1975.36 His treating
psychiatrist certified not only that Henig was not dangerous to
himself or to anyone else, and not in need of hospitalization, but
also that hospitalization or incarceration might endanger his
recovery. 7 A trial was held to determine whether Henig was
entitled to a hearing before his commitment. 3' The court ruled that
he was entitled to the same procedures used to determine committability of a person who is not otherwise before a court and that his
examination be conducted on an outpatient basis.39 In a 4-1
decision, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court reversed the trial judge's decision and ordered that Henig be
committed for the purpose of examination to determine if he was
dangerous. 40 It is clear that the appeals court viewed an insanity
acquittee, necessarily found to have committed an unlawful (and in

33. Henig v. Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, 383 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1976).
34. Id at 794.
35. Id
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id at 795.
40. 392 N.Y.S.2d 636,638 (1977), aft'd, 401 N.Y.S.2d 462,464 (1977); ("After commitment,
petitioner can seek release by presenting evidence supporting a claim that the period of confinement
is excessive. The burden will then be upon the State to prove petitioner is dangerous so as to require
continued incarceration.").

1133

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
this case, violent) act, as not entitled to procedures ordinarily
accorded to civilly committed patients.41
The New York law was changed in 1980 so that it is now
possible for an acquittee who has been on bail to be evaluated for
dangerousness on an outpatient basis.42 In reality, however, such
evaluations are almost always performed with the acquittee in
confinement. Furthermore, the rule in almost all other states
requires that the acquittee be in confinement.43
An even more obvious abuse of psychiatry is the retention in
hospitals of individuals who have "recovered their sanity," but
whose confinement is now based on their current mental condition,
that is, their character disorder, not related to the mental disease or
defect determined by the factfinder to have been present at the time
of the commission of the crime. Once inmates have recovered from
the mental illness, such individuals are indistinguishable from
prison inmates, thus maldng the reasons for their continued
confinement in mental hospitals mainly punitive. Legislators and
judges alone cannot be blamed for this flagrant use of hospitals as
psychiatric prisons. The psychiatric profession has, sad to say, a
long history of advocating, however well-intentioned, the continued
hospitalization of acquittees with personality disorders.44

41. The view that insanity acquittees belong to a special class was aclmowledged and endorsed
by the Supreme Court in Jones v. United States: 'Tlis holding accords with the widely and
reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be treated
differently from other candidates for commitment." 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
42. Act of June 26, 1980, 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 548, cited in Abraham Halpem et al., New
York's Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980: A ForensicPsychiatric Perspective,45 ALB. L. REV.
661, 665 (1981).
43.

GRANT MoRRs, THE INsANriY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LGISLATIVE REFoRM 61

(1975).
44.

See, e.g., WlLIAM A. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 224-25 (1923). Dr.

White, one of America's most distinguished psychiatrists, later president of the American Psychiatric
Association, wrote in the early 1920s:
The further apprehension that the criminal would frequently escape the consequences of
his act by being sent to a hospital rather than to a prison is based wholly upon a
misconception. The basic object of criminology is to cure the fault, or at least do the best
that can be done and not wreak vengeance upon the offender. Society would be as
adequately protected with the criminal in a hospital for the insane as if he were in a prison
and there would, too, be a better chance that he might come out, in part at least, socially
rehabilitated. In this connection it is interesting to note that a review of the criminal
population of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital shows that the criminal who is sent here from
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For example, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry in
its report on "Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert
Testimony" recommended that:
When a verdict of acquittal on the defense of mental illness is recorded,
the Court shall immediately commit the defendant to a public institution
for the custody, care and treatment of cases of the class to which the

defendant belongs, and the defendant shall not be discharged therefrom
unless and until the Court has adjudicated that he has regained his
capacity for judgment, discretion and control of his affairs and social
relations.4 5
In 1955 the American Law Institute (ALl) proposed an insanity

rule in its Model Penal Code, 46 designed to replace the more
narrow and restrictive M'Naghten Rule,47 then in use in almost all

prison stays in the hospital on the average of two and one-half times longer than he would
have stayed in prison had he been discharged at the expiration of his sentence. This ought
to help satisfy those who want the criminal punished. The principle is that the criminal
by his own acts, so to speak, commits himself to the custody of the state there to stay, not
for an arbitrarily predetermined time, but until he demonstrates by positive evidence, his
ideas and his conduct, that there is reason to believe he might get on outside.
Id.
45. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY REPORT No. 26 (1954).
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 25, 1955). This section, in part,
provided:

(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
R, The 1962 Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code added the word "wrongfulness" in
parentheses following the word "criminality" in Paragraph Gne.
47. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). In this case the court declared:
The jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and
to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defense on the ground of insanity,
it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong.
Id. at 722. The M'Naghten rule has been widely criticized by psychiatrists:
Ihe objections of doctors with experience of mental disease have remained in substance
unchanged throughout the last hundred years. Briefly, they have contended that the
M'Naghten test is based on an entirely obsolete and misleading conception of the nature
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American jurisdictions. The ALI rule established two prongs for
making the determination of criminal responsibility. Under the first
prong, referred to as the cognitive prong, a defendant is not
responsible if, at the time of the conduct, the defendant suffered
from a mental disease that caused the defendant to lack subsequent
capacity to appreciate the criminality of the conduct.48 Under the
second part, referred to as the volitional prong, the defendant may
be absolved of responsibility if, as a result of the disease or defect,
the defendant was unable to conform his behavior to the
requirements of the law.4 9 The second paragraph of the ALI rule
specifies that repeated criminal or anti-social behavior was not to
be considered a "mental disease or defect."50 The ALI rule's

[Tihe objections of doctors with experience of mental disease have remained in substance
unchanged throughout the last hundred years. Briefly, they have contended that the
M'Naghten test is based on an entirely obsolete and misleading conception of the nature
of insanity, since insanity does not only, or primarily, affect the cognitive or intellectual
faculties, but affects the whole personality of the patient, including both the will and the
emotions. An insane person may therefore often know the nature and quality of his act
and that it is wrong and forbidden by law, but yet commit it as a result of the mental
disease.
ROYAL Co MISsION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHmENT 1949-1953, REPORT 80 (1953). In United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit rejected the M'Naghten test, and instead
opted for the ALI standard as "the soundest yet formulated." Id at 624. The court explained that the
M'Naghten rule was incompatible with modem psychiatric theory because it focused solely on the
cognitive or intellectual component of the mind-the ability to distinguish between right and wrong.
Id. In contrast, the ALI formulation "views the mind as a unified entity and recognizes that mental
disease or defect may impair its functioning in numerous ways." Id. at 622-23. Another reason why
the court adopted the ALI test is its explicit recognition of degrees of incapacity. Id The M'Naghten
rule required a complete and total lack of capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. Id. A
primary virtue of the ALI test was its use of the adjective "substantial" to describe incapacity. Id. In
the court's view, this modifying adjective broadened M'Naghten and, thus, while "'any' incapacity
is not sufficient to justify avoidance of criminal responsibility . . . 'total' incapacity is also
unnecessary." Id. The court also noted that the use of the term "appreciate" in the Model Penal Code
test rather than "know" was a significant change from the M'Naghten rule. Id.; see Model Penal
Code, § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft explanatory note 1962). "[MI]ere intellectual awareness that
conduct is wrongful, when divorced from appreciation or understanding of the moral or legal import
of behavior, can have little significance," the court explained. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 623. Thus, the
ALI test further expanded the M'Naghten rule by requiring a failure to apprehend the significance
of one's actions in some deeper sense involving "affect" or "emotional appreciation," rather than
some surface understanding or verbalization of knowledge. RrTA J. SIMoON & DAVID E. AARONSON,
THE INsANITY DEFENSE: A CRmcAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND PoLicy INTHE POsT-HINCKLEY ERA
39 (1988).
48. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 25, 1955).
49. Ic. § 4.01(2).
50. Icd
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second prong contrasts significantly with the older M'Naghten test
which determines criminal responsibility on the basis of whether or
not the defendant labored under such a defect of reason because of
mental-disease that he did not know the quality and nature of his
act, or if he did know, that he did not know that he was doing was
wrong.
With the ALI "reform," however, came the strong recommendation that automatic post-acquittal confinement be mandated
whenever an acquittal occurs.5 The ALI apparently saw nothing
wrong with retaining custody of acquittees who were either no

longer mentally ill or who were not treatable. 2 Manfred
Guttmacher, psychiatric consultant to the ALI, also endorsed
mandatory post-acquittal commitment in part because "it tends to

discourage insanity pleas with a frivolous foundation."53 This is
like saying that surgery should be performed with unsterilized
instruments so that persons with Munchausen syndrome54 would
be dissuaded from seeking a medically unwarranted operation.
By 1975, sixteen states and almost all federal jurisdictions used
some form of the ALI draft.55 It was, however, recognized by a

51. Ie § 4.08 cmt. The drafters explain in their comment that: "The provision for automatic
commitment... not only provides the public with the maximum immediate protection, but also
works to the advantage of mentally disordered or defective defendants by making the defense of
irresponsibility more acceptable to the public and to the jury." Id.
52. Id. The drafters further explained:
"It seems preferable to make dangerousness the criterion for continued custody, rather
than to provide that the committed person may be discharged or released when restored
to sanity as defined by the mental hygiene laws. Although his mental disease may have
greatly improved, such a person may still be dangerous because of factors in his
personality and background other than mental disease. Also, such a standard provides a
possible means for the control of the occasional defendant who may be quite dangerous
but who successfully feigned mental disease to gain an acquittal."
IcL(emphasis added).
53. Id. § 4.01 (app. B).
54. Munchausen syndrome is a not uncommon disorder characterized by the repeated, knowing
simulation of disease for the sole purpose of obtaining medical attention.
55. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 1985); IDAHO
CODE § 18-207 (Michie 1987); ILI. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(a) (West 1989); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM.
LAW § 25 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552-030 (Vernon 1969); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1)
(1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.295 (1973); T.P.C.A. § 8.01 (West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 4801 (Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 1985); United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1972); Wade
v. United States, 426 F.2d 64,70 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 913 (5th Cir.
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few courts and legislatures that the characteristics of the "true
psychopath" were not confined solely to "repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct," and seven states and two federal
circuits limited the test to the first paragraph of the ALI
formulation.56 Modifications in the insanity rule were for the most
part in response to public outcries, when a particularly egregious
crime resulted in an insanity acquittal, or to pressures from special
interest groups, when a meritorious case resulted in conviction."
Chief Judge John Biggs, Jr., of the United States Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit, the foremost proponent of the argument that
psychopaths should not be excluded from the exculpatory insanity
rule,58 succeeded in persuading his colleagues on the court that
the M'Naghten rules "are not only unfair to the individual but are
dangerous to society" and should be discarded.59 He was no doubt
prompted to adopt this position by courts which saw great danger
1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chandler, 393
F.2d 920, 925 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606,624 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420,427 (10th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751,758 (3d Cir. 1961); Dragon v. State, 316 N.E.2d
827 (Ind. 1974); Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Ky. 1963); Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556,563 (Mass. 1967); State v. Staten, 267 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ohio 1971); State
v. Grimm, 195 S.E.2d 637, 647(W.Va. 1973);.
56. These jurisdictions are: Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Oregon, Texas, Vermont,
Wisconsin, the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. (Their tests do not include Paragraph (2) which
reads: -The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.").
57. In 1984, Congress, with the strong support of the American Psychiatric Association,
adopted a modified M'Naghten rule ("unable to appreciate" rather than "did not know" wrongfulness
of the act). See The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 (1984); See, e.g.,
Loren Roth, Tighten but Do Not Discard,251 JAMA 2949 (1984). California, after adopting the
A.L.I. rule in 1978 in People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 339, 583 P.2d 1318, 1320, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275,
277 (1979), legislatively restored the MNaghren rule (CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b)) following a voter
referendum in 1984. This legislation was subsequently upheld in People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765,
704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 (1985).
58. See JOHN BIGGs, JR., THE GUILTY MIND: PsYCHIATRY AND THE LAW op HOMICIDE 145
(1955). Chief Judge Biggs wrote that:
So long as the courts judge criminal responsibility by the test of knowledge of right and
wrong, psychotics who have served prison terms or are granted probation are released to
commit increasingly serious crimes, repeating crime and incarceration and release until
murder is committed. Instead of being treated as ordinary criminals, they should be
confined to institutions for the insane at the lrst offense and not be released until or
unless cured.
Id.
59. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767 (3d Cir. 1961).
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in confining "M'Naghten criminals" 60 to prison with the
"guarantee of release to [these] technically sane but criminally
depraved men at the end of their sentences. 61 In United States v.
Currens, the Third Circuit eliminated the cognitive prong of the
ALI test,62 and laid down the comprehensive volitional standard
known as the Currens Rule. 63 The court, thus, adopted Robert W.
White's64 view of Hervey Cleckley's "true psychopathic
personality."65 Concluding that the psychopath is to be seen as
suffering from "a mental disease or defect," which might even be
classed as a psychosis, the Currens court instructed that "he must
be found not to possess the guilty mind, the mens rea, necessary to
constitute his prohibited act a crime."' Research studies in
psychopathy conducted over the past few years would appear to
lend support for Judge Biggs' view of the M'Naghten criminal,67

60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 164 A.2d 98, 111 (Pa. 1960).
61. Il at 110.
62. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
63. l at 774. The court explained:
The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant,

as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated.
Id The Thlrd Circuit, in fact, rejected most of the extant insanity tests, because:
They do not account for the fact that an insane' defendant commits the crime not because
his mental illness causes him to do a certain prohibited act but because the totality of his
personality is such, because of mental illness, that he has lost the capacity to control his
acts in the way that the normal individual can and does control them.
Id
64. See ROBERT WHITr, THE ABNORMAL PE soNALTY 401 (1948), quoted in Currens, 290
F.2d at 762. White explains his view of the "true psychopathic personality":
It is clear that we are dealing with a fairly serious disorder. There are grave disturbances
in the patient's affective life as well as in foresight and the control and organization of
behavior. Cleckley considers the condition serious enough to be classed as a psychosis.
Although the patient outwardly presents a 'convincing mask of sanity' and a 'mimicry of
human life,' he has lost contact with the deeper emotional accompaniments of experience
and with its purposiveness. To this extent he may be said to have an incomplete contact
with reality, and it is certainly very hard to approach him and influence him
therapeutically.
Il
65. HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANrrY 396 (5th ed. 1976).
66. Currens, 290 F.2d at 774.
67. Judge Biggs (who, it is interesting to note, had served as consultant to the Committee on
Psychiatry and Law of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry) never equivocated in his view
of the psychopath and what should be done with him. In a letter dated July 19, 1956, to the Chairman
of the Advisory Committee on the Revision of the Virgin Islands Code, he re-emphasized his position
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who should be given special attention by the criminal justice
system.68 While the federal courts were expanding the scope of
the insanity defense to psychopaths, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code made their punitive intent clear.
It is significant that the Model Penal Code required courts,
following acquittal of a defendant on the ground of mental disease

that the psychopath's disorder rose to the level of psychosis and that psychiatric hospitalization was
the preferred disposition for such an offender. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927,
951-52 (3d Cir. 1978). Judge Biggs wrote:
The adherence by most of the courts in the United States and of the British
Commonwealth to the out-worn MNaghren formula presents great danger to the body
politic. As you know, quite frequently the psychotic criminal works his way up the ladder
of crime, commencing with the smaller offenses, such as larceny or simple assault. He is
tried and condemned for these offenses as if he were an ordinary criminal simply because
he knows the difference between "right" and "wrong" under the MNaghten formula. He
emerges from prison untreated and uncured and frequently goes on to more serious crimes
such as rape or murder. The M'Naghten formula should be cast aside and psychotic
criminals should be confined in institutions for the criminally insane for treatment and
cure, if cure be possible. Otherwise, incarceration must be permanent. That is what the
GAP statute, heretofore quoted, is intended to effect and what I think it would accomplish.
lad Needless to say, Judge Biggs heartily endorsed the ALI provision that release from confimement
subsequent to automatic post-acquittal commitment would require that "the burden shall be upon the
committed person to prove that he may safely be discharged or released" if the Court is not satisfied
with the reports and testimony of psychiatrists recommending release. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
68. See, e.g., Stephen Hart et al., The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R): An Overview
ForResearchersand Clinicians,in 8 ADVANCES INPSYCtOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 103 (James Rosen
et al. eds., 1992). These researchers argue that:
Psychopathy can be differentiated from other personality disorders on the basis of its
characteristic pattern of interpersonal, affective, and behavioral symptoms. Interpersonally,
psychopaths are grandiose, egocentric, manipulative, dominant, forceful, and cold-hearted.
Affectively, they display shallow and labile emotions, are unable to form long-lasting
bends to people, principles, or goals, and are lacking in empathy, anxiety, and genuine
guilt or remorse. Behaviorally psychopaths are impulsive and sensation-seeking, and tend
to violate social norms; the most obvious expressions of these predispositions involve
criminality, substance abuse, and a failure to fulfill social obligations and responsibilities.
Id. at 105; see also Robert Hare, et al., Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial
PersonalityDisorder, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 1-8 (1991). There is strong evidence to support
a diagnostic category of Psychopathic Personality Disorder to be distinguished from Antisocial
Personality Disorder in DSM-IV. The criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder emphasize antisocial
and criminal behavior whereas definitions of psychopathy typically include explicit reference to
affective and interpersonal characteristics. That is to say, Antisocial Personality Disorder criteria do
not distinguish the callous, remorseless, and manipulative psychopath from other antisocial
individuals. Hare and his colleagues have shown that 75 to 80 percent of convicted felons warrant
the diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder, while only 15 to 25 percent of convicted felons are
identified as psychopaths. Id at 6. If validated, such findings would argue strongly for the
establishment of special prison programs for the psychopathic criminal.
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or defect excluding responsibility, to "order him to be committed

to the custody of the Commissionerof Correction[Mental Hygiene
or Public Health] to be placed in an appropriate institution for

custody, care and treatment."69 Use of the words "Commissioner
of Correction" and "appropriate institution" makes it clear that the
ALI intended that an acquittee be placed in a prison, not a hospital,

under certain circumstances. Deleting "Commissioner of
Correction" in the 1962 Proposed Official Draft7° , designed to
eliminate the obvious implication of these words, in no way
lessened the punitive intent of the automatic post-acquittal
confinement provision.7 Therefore, despite the availability of
acquittal and treatment in a mental facility, the Model Penal Code
language left a significant loophole for law makers to justify the
confinement of the mentally ill in the general prison population.
This loophole enabled the drafters to simultaneously espouse the

69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 4., Apr. 25, 1955) (emphasis
added).
70. Id. § 4.08(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
71. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (stating "that
an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
defect"). The Durham rule, although rejected by the All, was "warmly supported by psychiatrists."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt., at 173 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This rule must be analyzed
in conjunction with the District of Columbia law governing the matter of post-acquittal confinement.
See Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 60 n.12 (8th Cir. 1956). This court declared:
The remedy of treatment results in the accused returning to the life of the community only
after disinterested experts think he may safely do so; whereas the person imprisoned enters
again into the community when his sentence is served though he may not be ready for a
law-abiding life. For these reasons, as well as because the criminal law does not punish
in the absence of blame, we should guard against imprisonment where a reasonable doubt
exists as to sanity in its relation to the crime charged.
letThe court, in Williams v. United States, further explained the District of Columbia law:
Under our criminal jurisprudence, mentally responsible law breakers are sent to prison;
those who are not mentally responsible are sent to hospitals. To that end the District Code
makes possible a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, and directs that under such
a verdict the defendant is to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until it is
determined that he "has recovered his sanity ...[and] will not in the reasonable future
be dangerous to himself or others." Two policies underlie the distinction in treatment
between the responsible and the non-responsible: (1) It is beth wrong and foolish to
punish where there is no blame and where punishment cannot correct. (2) The
community's security may be better protected by hospitalization under D.C. Code, § 24301 than by imprisonment.
250 F.2d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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humanitarian goals of treatment and the punitive goals of the
criminal justice system.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
After the acquittal of John Hinckley, both the American Bar
Association (ABA)72 and the American Psychiatric Association
(APA)73 abandoned their previous approval of the ALI insanity
rule, and, instead, proposed a M'Naghten-type test.74 The ABA
placed great stress on the importance of court hearings in the postacquittal period, ignoring the fact that hearings give but the
appearance of fairness in many cases without changing the
detention status of the acquittee.75 The APA recommendations
unwittingly set the stage for prolonged hospitalization of the
acquittee.76 This proposal has provided certain punitive judges

72. AmucAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY ON THE INSANITY
DEFENSE (approved by the ABA House of Delegates on February 9, 1983).
73. AMERICANPsYCIATRIC ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PsYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION STATEENT
ON THE INSANrFY DEFENSE 12 (1982).
74.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 72 ("RESOLVED, that the American Bar
Association approves, in principle, a defense of nonresponsibility for a crime which focuses solely
on whether the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the offense charged."); AMEricAN PsYCHLiATIUC
ASSOCIATION, supra note 73 ("A person charged with a criminal offense should be found not guilty

by reason of insanity

if it is shown that as a result of mental disease or mental retardation he was

unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense. As used in this
standard, the terms mental disease or mental retardation include only those severely abnormal mental
conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of reality and
that are not attributable primarily to the voluntary ingestion of alcohol or other psychoactive
substances.").
75. See CmuNAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-7.8 (A.B.A. Tentative Draft No.
1, 1983).
76. AMERiCAN PSYcwATRIc ASSOCIATION, supra note 73, at 12, 16 (1982). After indicating
that "a long period of conditional release with careful supervision and outpatient treatment will be
necessary to protect the public and to complete the appropriate treatment programs," the APA
Statement on the Insanity Defense asserts:
Unfortunately, however, many jurisdictions have neither the trained personnel nor
appropriate outpatient facilities and resources to provide for such close management of
previously violent persons who are conditionally released. Where statutes provide for
conditional release and judges allow it without these necessary resources, the public is
subjected to great risk and the insanity acquittee is deprived of an opportunity for a
necessary phase of treatment.
Ia
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with a "medical" justification not to release acquittees from
confinement.

77

The House of Delegates of the American Medical Association
(AMA), on December 6, 1983, overwhelmingly voted to support,
in principle, "the abolition of the special defense of insanity in
criminal trials, and its replacement by statutes providing for
acquittal when the defendant as a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked the state of mind (mens rea) required as an element of the
offense charged." 78 The AMA position, however, called for
"presumption of continuing dangerousness," and for the
requirement that absolute or conditional release be based on7
"concurring medical certification and judicial determination."1
This ensured that ongoing confinement could be effected depending
on the attitude of judges as described herein.
It may, however, be noted that the proposed AMA rule, rigidly
and literally applied, would effectively lead to the conviction of
almost all severely mentally disordered offenders (and certainly all
mildly to moderately mentally disordered offenders) charged with
violent crime. John W. Hinckley, Jr., for example, would have
gained acquittal under the rule recommended by the ABA and the

77. See, e.g., State v. Jacob, 669 P.2d 865 (Utah 1983). The Supreme Court of Utah, basing
its decision on the APA Statement, affirmed the District Court's conclusion that, "as defendant could
not be relied upon to take the required medication, he still represented a danger to himself and others
which justified continued confinement." I at 868. The Court held that conditional release was
simply not available and the "trial court's determination of the question of defendant's release in
terms of recovery from 'mental illness,' i.e. current condition, rather than recovery of 'sanity,* i.e.
standard applying at time of crime, was not unconstitutional retroactive increase in punishment." Il
at 870. The majority of the court chose not to incorporate the following comment made by Judge
Camaby in a concurring opinion:
This court should not accept the proposition that a patient must be hospitalized for life
because state statutes fail to provide for a release conditioned on participation in a
mandatory court-ordered out-patient program wherein the patient will receive the required
medication and counseling on a regular basis. The problem should be referred by this
Court to the Legislature. The court should review this case after allowing sufficient time
for legislative action and implementation, say 1987.
Il at 871 (Camaby, J., concurring).
78. Insanity Defense in CriminalTrials and Limitations of PsychiatricTestimony: Report of
the AMA Board of Trustees, 251 JAMA 2967 (1984).
79. Abraham Halpern, The AMA Report on the Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials, 56
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 236, 237 (1984) (emphasis added).
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APA as easily as under the ALI rule used in his trial." The same
defense expert witnesses would have testified that his mental
condition was severely abnormal and grossly and demonstrably
impaired his perception or understanding of reality, rendering him
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of
the offense.81 Hinckley, however, would have been convicted
under the AMA rule. The gunman, despite his mental disorder,
would have been found to possess sufficient mental intent, (mens
rea) required as an element of the offense charged.
In the ambience of the hyperactive hysteria that followed the
Hinckley NGRI acquittal, Congress enacted a bill dubbed, in
classical Orwellian "doublespeak," "The Insanity Defense 'Reform'
Act of 1984" (hereinafter IDRA).82 The bill was signed into law
by President Reagan on October 12, 1984. The insanity standard as
adopted by Congress, which was the first such statute to be enacted
for all federal jurisdictions, is patterned after the formulation
recommended by the APA and ABA.83
It is my contention that the various definitions of legal insanity
advanced by the several groups are distinctions without a
difference, and the claimed narrowing of the insanity rule is
without substance. The psychiatrist or psychologist who testifies on
behalf of a patient-defendant, who is charged with serious crime,
will invariably see the mental disorder as "severe," rendering the

80. The jury found that he "lacked substantial capacity to appreciate" the wrongfulness of his
conduct. Likewise, had the jury followed the same reasoning used to arrive at that conclusion, the
jury would have decided that he was "unable to appreciate" the wrongfulness of his conduct.
81. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CERF & VICTOR NAVASKY, THE EXPERTS SPEAK 69-70 (1984);
THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: Tim ORIOINS AND EVOLUTION OF Th INSANITY DEFENSE
141-51 (1985); PETER Low Ir AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY INTHE
INSANITY DEFENSE 22-82 (1986); RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE:

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF LAw AND POLCY IN THE POST-HINcKLEY ERA 87-89 (1988).
82. INSANrrY DEFENSE REFORM ACt OF 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified
as 18 U.S.C. § 20) (1984).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (Supp. II 1982). The new rule, replacing the more "liberal" ALl standard
used in most federal courts, reads in part:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of
the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe
mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
Id
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defendant not responsible, from a psychiatric standpoint, for his
conduct. The words "unable to appreciate," "at the time of," and
"as a result of" are no bar to the defense psychiatrist's seeking to
explain the defendant's entitlement to exculpation.
The really significant portion of the IDRA lies in section 4243
which is entitled "Hospitalization of a person found not guilty only
by reason of insanity."" This passage requires that an insanity
acquittee, whose offense involved bodily injury or serious property
damage, or a substantial risk thereof, bears the burden of proving
his eligibility for release by clear and convincing evidence. The
acquittee must show that his mental disease or defect does not
make him a substantial risk to persons or property upon release.86
If the offense did not involve bodily injury, etc., the acquittee must
still prove (although by a preponderance of the evidence) that his
release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury, etc., due
to a present mental disease or defect.87 Here, the mental disease
or defect does not have to be of the degree of seriousness
categorized as "severe," the standard laid down in the federal
exculpatory insanity rule.88 In other words, the standard for
release is mental disease or defect, not "severe" mental disease or
defect.89 It is clear, then, that a person affected with a
psychopathic personality disorder could continue to be hospitalized,
even though he no longer suffers from the severe mental disease or
defect which resulted in his acquittal. It should be noted that a
person who poses a danger only to himself cannot be denied
release under the federal IDRA.' Therefore, the federal IDRA

84. Id § 4243 (1984).
85. Id § 4243 (d).
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id
89. The hallmarks of a disorder characterized as "severe" are delusions and/or hallucinations
(e.g. schizophrenia), suicidal depression (e.g., major depressive disorder), and mania (e.g., bipolar
disorder, manic). The psychopath does not ordinarily manifest such overt symptomatology.
90. But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1990) (requiring an acquittee to prove that he is
no longer dangerous to himself or others). See also United States v. Crutchfield, 893 F.2d 376 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). Here, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in ruling that the IDRA was intended to apply
only to prospective acquittees, held that passage of the Act did not make application of the District
of Columbia's "self-harm" provision unconstitutional. Id. at 380. That is, equal protection is not
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provides government with a mechanism to prolong an inmate's

confimement despite the fact that the inmate has been "cured" of
the defect responsible for the crime. As will become evident in the
next Section, the federal government is not alone in its imposition
of rigorous prerequisites to an acquittee's release.
V. REPRESENTATIVE COURTS' POST-ACQUrrrAL CONFINEMENT
DECISIONS AND THE MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY
The misuse of psychiatry commences usually without fanfare
when the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Defense and prosecution negotiation, rather than the open trial, is
the more common method used to arrive at the verdict.91
Thus, treatment and rehabilitation are the stated altruistic goals
as confinement is ordered when the NGRI verdict is announced.
However, retribution and preventative detention are the obvious
objectives as the courts, suddenly showing none of the traditional
judicial deference to the decisions made by an administrative
agency, seek assiduously to identify or create reasons to keep the
acquittee "under observation in the institution for a sufficiently
long period, even after a cure appears, in order to make certain that

violated by not releasing an acquitte (committed prior to enactment of the new law) who is
dangerous to himself but not to others, even though the IDRA requires only that the acquittee prove
he is not a danger to others. Id at 379. One can imagine the confusion of patients and the
consternation and demoralization of staff members at a Washington hospital when suicidal patients,
who are not dangerous to others, admitted after October 12, 1984, must be released at their request,
while suicidal acquittees admitted prior to that date can be retained for treatmentl
91.

See, e.g., Robert Sadoff, The Insanity Defense: Why it Should be Retained, 12 J. LEO.

MED. 33 (June 1977). Sadoff has described the procedure as follows:
In a number of cases that are not highly celebrated, the prosecution and the defense
psychiatrists all agreed that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the crime. As
a result, the defendant may not be tried because of this agreement. The judge may accept
the agreement, make a declaration of insanity and, upon proper testimony, commit the
individual to a hospital for treatment of his mental illness. In this way, there is an
agreement, an adjudication, and a sparing of the mentally ill individual from the
difficulties of the adversary system; also, there is a proper legal disposition of the case.
Id. at 33.
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the apparent cure is not merely temporary, or as is known in
psychiatry, a period of remission."92
State v. Maik,93 decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey,

illustrates the attitude of many courts toward insanity acquittees.
The court in this case propounded the view that confimement of an

insanity acquittee could continue until a complete cure of the
underlying illness or personality disorder was effected. 94 Former

Chief Justice Weintraub wrote that:
An offender is not 'restored to reason' unless he is so freed of the
underlying illness that his 'reason' can be expected to prevail. Hence
the underlying or latent personality disorder, and not merely the
psychotic episode which emerged from it, is the relevant illness, and the

statutory requirement for restoration to reason as a precondition for
release from custody is not met so long as the underlying illness
continues? 5
The Maik court's rationale seems to parallel the principles
previously discussed in relation to the federal IDRA.96
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Carter,97 in a
decision hailed as one which "provided some flexibility and set
standards for conditional release," 98 seemed to soften the
harshness of the unanimous opinion in Maik.99 The court,

92. In re Rosenfeld, 157 F. Supp. 18, 20 (1957); see also Alexander D. Brooks, Notes on
Defining the "Dangerousness' of the Mentally 114 in DANamoRs BEHAvIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW
AND MENTAL HEAt H 37 (Calvin J.Frederick ed. 1978). Brooks has cogently pointed out that "Trial
judges have been known to ignore and subvert, on a day-to-day basis, the unpopular mandates of
reviewing courts or legislatures which they regard as unrealistic." lXZ
93. 287 A.2d 715 (NJ. 1972).
94. Id. at 723.
95. lId
96. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing the federal IDRA's rules
governing post-acquittal confinement).
97. 316 A.2d 449 (NJ. 1978).

98.

Irwin N. Pert,Problems SurroundingRelease of PersonsFound Not Guilty By Reason of

Insanity 20 L FORENsIc Sci. 719, 725 (1975).
99. See Carter,316 A.2d at 453. The court reasoned that:
While the Court recognizes the overriding concern for public safety involved in

commitments subsequent to an adjudication of insanity, we do not believe that the
commission of an offense against the laws of this state by one subsequently adjudicated
insane and committed to a state hospital is a carte blanche justification for lifetime
commitment where the underlying mental condition is incurable.
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however, also provided that the benefit of the doubt concerning a
patient's potential for dangerous conduct was not going to be given
easily to the patient."° As in Maik, the Carter decision makes it
clear that courts retain the power to determine when one has been
restored to reason and is able to function in society without fear of
harming others.1"' Enough vagueness and hedging characterize

the New Jersey Supreme Court's position so that a hospital's
recommendations for even conditional release of an insanityacquittee are likely to run into very stiff resistance from a
retention-minded judge. 02
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held, in State
v. Krol,0 3 that, before recommitment is effected, a hearing must

Id
100. Id at 457-58. The court opined:
Surely a psychiatrist would not allow a patient to come and go as he pleased when the
doctor was convinced that his patient was bent on and capable of perpetrating a violent
crime. Similarly, society and the courts cannot be asked to ignore the commission of an
act in violation of the State's criminal laws. The actor shows by his behavior that he poses
some threat. This demonstrated ability to cause harm distinguishes him from others who
may very well be as abnormal or "sick" but only possess a potential to harm others. We
may not search out the deranged, sick or abnormal among us, but when they announce
themselves to us with an otherwise criminal act, there is no reason to ignore them.
Id.
101. See Id at 458.
102. See Id While noting that the goal of confimement is to remove the underlying condition,
the court indicated that something less than a "cure" is acceptable for compliance with the "restored
to reason" standard of conditional release ... one's condition need only be "effectively neutralized."
Id at 459. This neutralization is apparently something less than a cure which eliminates the
underlying illness in its entirety. Neutralization, however, is clearly something more than remission.
As the court reasoned, the mere abatement of symptoms provides no assurance that the public is safe
from harm:
Dangerousness is not, however, the sole criterion for release. If the patient is in a state of
remission and there are sufficient medical assurances that he will pose no threat to society,
there may be no danger to be feared from his conditional release. There may, however,
be a rehabilitative purpose in retaining the patient in hospital if further progress can be
made in "curing" his underlying condition. Public protection may demand prolonged
confinement in hopes of eventual recovery and release.
Id at 461. The court further outlined the procedures which a judge must follow in making an
assessment:
If the judge is not satisfied with the amount or quality of evidence presented, he is free
to order further examination or appoint additional experts. In dealing with uncontroverted
evidence, however, the judge must guard against a complete disregard of expert testimony
absent any basis for disagreement.
Id at 462.
103. 344 A.2d 289 (NJ. 1975).
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take place at which the State would be required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee was dangerous to
himself or to others."°4 What must be recognized, however, is
that a mandated hearing does little to alter the power of a
confinement-minded judge to order the continued detention of the
acquittee. The New Jersey Supreme Court, itself, took pains to alert
(and frighten) trial judges who are considering the conditional
release of an insanity acquittee by cautioning that "even where the
[patient's] condition shows marked improvement, only the most
extraordinary case would justify modification in any manner other
than by a gradual de-escalation of the restraints upon the [patient's]
liberty. 105
The New York case of In re Miller,1" is illustrative of the
means which a trial judge can employ to prolong an acquittee's
confinement. Here, the judge, in rejecting the hospital staff's
recommendation that the acquittee be released, held that "[ilt is not
essential under the law that dangerousness be coupled with mental
illness, or that release necessarily follow upon recovery of
sanity."'0 7 Two years later, on appeal, the court ruled that another
hearing should take place.1" 8 This precaution was ordered because
such a long time had elapsed since the first hearing. 0 9 The court
gave little weight to the testimony of the "only" witnesses, four
psychiatrists, who concluded that the acquittee should be released
because "he was not suffering from mental disease or defect, was
without psychosis and would not be a danger to himself or
others." 10

104. l at 300.
105. State v. Fields, 390 A.2d 574, 584 (NJ. 1978).
106. 342 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1972).
107. Id. at 322.
108. In re Miller, 362 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1974).
109.
d at 633.
110. Id at 630. The extent to which the appellate court is willing to go to find some
justification to order the continued confinement of the insanity-acquittee is shown by the following

excerpt from the unanimous opinion:
Without disparaging or denigrating the profession of psychiatry, we suggest that the
witnesses summoned to the new hearing should include hospital employees such as
nurses, orderlies, housekeepers and others who have had daily or frequent contact with
petitioner. They will be able to relate to the court petitioner's actions and reactions to the
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Therefore, it is clear that the "dangerousness" of each acquittee
is not only difficult to ascertain, but that the standard itself is
almost impossible to determine."' Even given the above, how
can any reasonable person accept the approach taken in the case of
Overholser v. O'Beirne,"12 a case where the insanity acquittee
was considered by psychiatrists "on both sides" to be noncommittable?' Then Circuit Judge Warren Burger ruled that:
The suggestion that civil mental health commitment procedures, with
their "greater procedural safeguards," are a more appropriate remedy
seems to rest on the idea that O'Beirne cormitted a "non-dangerous
offense." But to describe the theft of watches and jewelry as "nondangerous" is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less
violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose
of the statute is the same as to both. Larceny, assault, and murder all
are dangerous; they are simply different areas of prohibited conduct.
Hence unless we are to ignore the objectives and policies of the statute
in question, the release provisions must apply in the same way and with
the same force to larceny without violence as to crime of violence until
Congress speaks otherwise."'

stresses and strains which are experienced in the usual happenings of each day. One may
put his best foot forward when interviewed or examined by one he knows vWI be
consulted on the question of his release, whereas he would be more likely to give

expression to his natural tendencies when dealing with non-professionals whom he would
not expect to be directly involved in decision making. It is suggested that a display of
ungovernable temper when one has been inconvenienced by a housekeeper having just
washed the floor may be more revealing and indicative of future conduct than the
expression one gives when he sits across the desk or lies on the couch of a psychiatrist.
Qualified psychiatrists can render great assistance in assessing an individual's mental
condition. However, the court should reach out for any available evidence which bears on
petitioner's conduct while in the Hospital.
l at 633-34.
111. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 301 (NJ. 1975) (stating that dangerousness is "a
concept which involves substantial elements of vagueness and ambiguity" and "it]ihe practical
application of a dangerousness standard is further impeded by the difficulty of making valid and
meaningful predictions of the likelihood of future harmful conduct").
112.
113.

302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Id at 861; see, e.g, JAY KATZ Er AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 615-17

(1967) (discussing O'Beirne).
114. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d at 861.
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That is precisely the view, however, that the Supreme Court of
the United States endorsed in Jones v. United States."5 Michael
Jones had established eight years earlier by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was not guilty by reason of insanity of the crime
of petit larceny for attempting to steal a jacket from a department
store." 6 The Court ruled that he could be confined to a mental
institution "until such time as he had regained his sanity or was no
longer a danger to himself or society," and that the confinement
could last "for a period longer than he could have been
' The Supreme Court went
incarcerated had he been convicted."117
beyond O'Beirne by commenting: "It also may be noted that
crimes of theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts
of the criminal to escape or the victim to protect property or the
police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.""' Clearly,. if such
reasoning were used in all misdemeanor cases in this country,
custodial sentences would need to be meted out in the hundreds of

thousands.
Examples of trial judge punitiveness, disguised as concern for
public safety, abound." 9 A more recent case, Francois v.

115. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
116. Id at 360.
117. See id at 368-70.
118. Id at 365 n.14.
119. See, e.g., In re Rosenfeld, 157 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.C. 1957) (ruling that a hospital
superintendent's certificate, stating that the petitioner had recovered sufficiently, "did not comply with
the statute since a sufficient recovery may mean a partial and not a total recovery"). This case
involved a defendant who had made such remarkable improvement that the judge, himself, was
moved to comment:
The Court was indeed impressed with the fact that as a result of modem psychiatric
treatment received at the hands of skilled psychiatrists in Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, the
petitioner made great progress toward reaching mental balance, a proper attitude toward
society, and adjustment to the community. He is now steadily employed in a restaurant
owned and operated by his sister. His own testimony discloses that he has acquired an
insight into his own past shortcomings and has apparently changed his attitude toward his
fellow man. There is no doubt that the progress made by this patient is a tribute to
modem psychiatric methods, as well as a credit to the accomplishments of the splendid
institution in which he was confimed, and to the individual psychiatrists who treated him.
The hospital psychiatrist testified unequivocally that the petitioner had recovered his sanity
and that he would not be dangerous to himself or others within the reasonable future.
Id at 22. In deciding that "the matter is not yet ripe for the granting of an unconditional release,"
the judge saw the meaning of the word "remission" as follows:
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Henderson2 ' graphically epitomizes the lengths to which trial
judges will go to keep insanity-acquittees in confinement. In this
case, six psychiatrists testified that the acquittee had for over five
years exhibited no abnormal or psychotic symptoms and had
received no psychotropic medication of any ldnd."' He had been
a model patient, demonstrating good demeanor and grooming, and
normal responsible actions and reactions."' Yet the judge, with
unrelenting determination to have the hospitalization continue,
asserted that the acquittee's exemplary conduct actually buttressed
his conclusion that the acquittee was mentally ill and dangerous,
because the acquittee was feigning sanity! 123 A court appointed
psychiatrist, as he had "in innumerable other similar cases" (and,
as a matter of fact, he was later to do in the Foucha case), declined
to certify that the acquittee would not be dangerous to himself or
others. 24 He later conceded that he had "hedged" in his
testimony because he did not want to be criticized should the

The term "remission" at best means a temporary, partial recovery. For example, Webster's
New International Dictionary, 1949 Edition, defines remission as "atemporary and
incomplete subsidence of the force or violence of a disease or of pain." The American
Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 1941 Edition, defimes the term as "a diminution or
abatement of the symptoms of a disease; also the period during which such diminution
occurs."
Id. at 22; see People v. Corrente, 311 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1970). The "defendant" in Corrente was found
to be "without psychosis at the present time" and "not dangerous either to himself or to the
community." I&,at 713-14. Nevertheless, the court, after expressing its indebtedness "to all counsel
and all physicians for their intelligent and even-handed assistance in these proceedings," denied the
application for release of the patient. Id. at 719. It was the court's position that: "The ultimate
determination must lie within the socio-legal discipline of the court after careful consideration of the
evidence and opinions submitted by these expert physicians." Id at 714; see also Powell v. Florida,
579 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1978). In Powell, the trial judge rejected the recommendation of a hospital
administrator and the treating physicians that an insanity-acquittee be released and the judge's order
to continue the commitment was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Id. at
326. The appeals court reasoned that since the trial judge had found that the final diagnosis of the
patient, "[P]sychosis with Drug Intoxication (Cocaine), in remission, was sufficient to constitute
mental illness within the meaning of Florida's commitment statute, the judge's finding of mental
illness should be considered to be supported by medical opinion and therefore the commitment was
proper." Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
120. 850 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988).
121. 1&4at 234.
122. Id at 233.
123. Id at 234.
124. Id; see infra 131-160 notes and accompanying text (discussing the Fouchacase).
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acquittee be released and then commit a criminal act.125 He
nevertheless agreed with the other psychiatrists that, even if the
acquittee were schizophrenic, he could not feign sanity for years on
end. 126 After the judge ordered the commitment continued, the
case was heard by a federal magistrate, who ordered the acquittee's
release. 27 The state, opposed to the release, appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, which finally
concurred that the commitment should end. 2 ' The court of
appeals, without ruling one way or the other on the constitutionality
of the Louisiana law that provided for confinement of insanityacquittees solely on a finding of dangerousness,12 9 was strongly
of the opinion that the statute violated the Constitution and made
the mental institution the substitute for the prison. 3
VI. THE CASE OF STATE V. FoucHA
For many years, state and lower federal courts were able to
make post-acquittal confinement decisions with little fear of
supervision from above. Recently, a divided United States Supreme
Court has intervened and struck down post-acquittal release
procedures that it found to be unconstitutional.
In State v. Foucha," Terry Foucha was found to have
committed an illegal discharge of a firearm and aggravated
32
burglary of an inhabited dwelling while armed with a revolver. 1
At a hearing on October 12, 1984, two court appointed experts in
forensic psychiatry testified that Foucha had a drug-induced
psychosis.1 33 The trial court rendered a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, finding that Foucha "is unable to appreciate the
usual, natural and probable consequences of his acts; that he is

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Francois,850 F.2d at 234.
Id at 235.
IM at 234.
I& at 236.
Ied(discussing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:59(A)).
IM

131.
132.

563 So.2d 1138 (La. 1990).
Id at 1138-39.

133.

Id.at 1139.
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unable to distinguish right from wrong; that he is a menace to
himself and others; and that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the crimes and that he is presently insane.""' 4 The
court ordered that he be admitted to the Feliciana Forensic Facility,
the maximum security Forensic Unit of the East Louisiana State
Hospital at Jackson, Louisiana.1 35 On June 11, 1987, the trial
court was notified that Foucha had requested a hearing to obtain
periodic passes with family supervision, and the same forensic
psychiatrists were appointed to examine him to determine his
present mental condition."16 After a hearing, the court denied the
pass and ordered that the "defendant be returned to the facility for
further care, custody and treatment." 137 Subsequently, a review
panel was convened because the superintendent of the facility
recommended that Foucha be discharged or released.1 38 Foucha
139
was found by the hospital staff to be not mentally ill.
The trial court found, in assessing release prospects, that
Foucha was a danger to others and ordered him recommitted. 4 '

134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id.
139. Id at 1140. On March 21, 1988, the panel issued a report recommending that Foucha be
conditionally discharged with the following stipulations:
1. He be placed on probation, the length to be determined by the court.
2.
He remain free from intoxicating and mind-altering substances.
3.
He attend a Substance Abuse Clinic on a regular basis.
4.
He submit to regular and random urine drug screens at the local mental
health center.
5.
He be actively employed, or seeking employment.
Id at 1140 n.7.
The panel stated that Foucha's diagnosis was Antisocial Personality Disorder and that he had
not displayed any evidence of this mental illness or mental disease since admission. d at 1141. At
a hearing on November 29, 1988, one of the forensic psychiatrists who had testified at Foucha's
initial sanity hearing stated that Foucha showed no evidence of psychosis or neurosis and that he was
in "good shape" mentally. Id He had two months earlier, however, been sent to the maximum
security section because of an altercation with another patient. Id The psychiatrist also testified that
if Foucha were released, the (drug-induced) psychosis could reassert itself. Id Therefore, the
psychiatrist refused to say that Foucha would not be a danger to others or to himself. Id. It was
stipulated that essentially the same testimony would be offered by the other forensic psychiatrist who
had also testified at the initial hearing. Id
140. Id at 1140.
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The court of appeal refused to review the correctness of the
decision not to release him, 41 and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana decided that Foucha did not prove that he could be
released without danger to others or to himself. 4 2 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that dangerousness, as determined by the
trial court, and not non-dangerousness and mental illness, as
determined by psychiatric personnel, to be the test for whether or
not there will occur continued detention in a psychiatric hospital of
a person found not guilty by reason of insanity.' 4 3

On May 18, 1992, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court, and held
that the Louisiana law which allowed the continued confinement of
an insanity acquittee who was found by a court to be dangerous,
was unconstitutional.'" The five to four decision concluded that
the Louisiana statute violated the Due Process Clause because it
allowed an insanity acquittee to be committed to a mental
institution until he was able to demonstrate that he was not
dangerous to himself and' 45others, even though he did not suffer
from any mental illness."'
While the ruling appears to have sweeping implications for the
handling of institutionalized insanity acquittees with antisocial
personality disorders, it basically affects only a handful of
states 46 that mandate continued retention of the acquittee solely

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id
Id at 1144.
Id
See State v. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1787 (1992).

145.

Id.

146. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e) (West Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 403(b)
(1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-415 (1985); IOWA CT. C.P.R. 21.8(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22.3428(3) (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301(3) (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(a)-(b)
(West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1(i) (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE § 19.2-182.6-182.7 (Supp.
1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.200(2) (West 1990); Wis. STAT. § 971-17(5) (West Supp. 1992).
These laws must be amended to conform with the Foucha decision. Two states (California and
Virginia) had, in fact, amended their laws prior to Foucha to provide for the release of acquittees
who do not suffer from mental illness but may be dangerous. See CAL. PENAL QODE § 1026.2 (West
Supp. 1992); VA. CODE § 19.2-182.6-182.7 (Supp. 1992). Three of the states (New Jersey,
Washington and Wisconsin) limit the maximum duration of commitment to reflect the acquittee's
specific crimes and require that acquittees be held in facilities appropriate to their mental condition.
See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:4-8(b)(3) (West 1982), 30:4-24.2 (West 1981); WAsH. REv. CODE §§
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on the grounds of dangerousness. It does not, nor is it intended to,
prevent a state from defining mental illness, mental disease, or
mental disorder, in such a way that an acquittee "suffering" from
a psychopathic personality disorder could indeed be indefinitely
confined.' 47
Be that as-it may, the views expressed by Justice O'Connor and
the dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas) make it likely that the Supreme Court
would endorse the position espoused by the Council of Psychiatry
and Law of the American Psychiatric Association. The Council
recommended that the continued hospitalization of non-mentally-ill
personality-disordered acquittees is justified on the grounds that
"[those who suffer from personality disorders may also benefit
from the special management available only in a psychiatric
institution where sensitive, comprehensive, unique and imaginative
treatment programs can often be developed to assist them in
overcoming their destructive behavior.', 48 Justice O'Connor
wrote: "I do not understand the Constitution to hold that Louisiana
may never confine dangerous insanity acquittees after they regain
mental health.' 49 She argued that if there were, even in the
absence of clear-cut mental illness, some "medical justification" for
doing so, it would be permissible to confine such insanity
acquittees since the necessary connection between the nature and
purposes of confinement would be present.'5 0 Because the four
dissenters strongly maintain that the State of Louisiana could keep

10.77-020(3), 10.77.110(1) (West 1990); Wis. STAT. § 971.17(l), (3)(c) (West Supp. 1992).
147. For example, nothing in the Foucha decision would have mandated the release of the
same Terry Foucha had he been hospitalized as an insanity acquittee in New York state where the

definition of 'mental illness," as it relates to dangerous mental disorder, is defined as "an affliction
with a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in
behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such an extent that the person afflicted requires care,
treatment and rehabilitation." Under this definition of mental illness, persons diagnosed with an
antisocial personality disorder, thus having a condition manifested at the very least by a disorder in

behavior, have remained involuntarily institutionalized in maximum security hospitals so long as,
because of the condition, they currently constitute a physical danger to themselves or others.
148. COUNCIL OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, FINAL
REPORT OF THE SUB-CoMMITaEE TO REVIEW THE INsANrrY DEFENSE 3 (1988).
149. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1789-90.
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an insanity-acquittee hospitalized if he could not prove that he was
not dangerous (an argument rejected by the majority),15 1 they
would surely settle for the scheme outlined by Justice O'Connor
that would permit continued institutionalization of a non-mentallyill but dangerous acquittee provided that "the nature and duration
of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety
concerns
15 2
related to the acquittee's continued dangerousness."'
The majority assailed, even ridiculed, the argument of Justice
Thomas (not surprisingly supported by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia) that "the State may indefinitely hold an insanity
acquittee who is found by a court to have been cured of his mental
illness and who is unable to prove that he would not be
dangerous., 15 3 Thomas maintained that Foucha should not be
released despite psychiatric opinion that he was not mentally ill
"because such opinion is not sufficiently precise--because
psychiatry is not an exact science and psychiatrists widely disagree
on what constitutes a mental illness.,, 154 The majority sharply
reminded Justice Thomas that psychiatric opinion was nevertheless
"reliable enough to permit the courts to base civil commitment on
clear and convincing medical evidence that a person is mentally ill
and dangerous and to base release decisions on qualified testimony
that the committee is no longer mentally ill or dangerous [and]...
also reliable enough for the State not trying a person who is at the
time found incompetent to understand the proceedings.' ' 55 The
majority caustically remarked that medical predictions of
dangerousness seem to be reliable enough for Justice Thomas "to
permit the State to continue to hold Foucha in a mental institution,
even where the psychiatrist would say no more than that he would
hesitate to certify that Foucha would not be dangerous to himself

151.
152.

Id at 1808 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
d at 1789.

153.

Id

154.
155.

See id.at 1783 n.4.
Id
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'
or others."156
The majority further suggested an alternative
to
57
specifically.'
Foucha
Terry
of
case
immediate release in the
It may well be that what the majority opinion in Foucha says
may, in the long run, not be as important as what it does not say.
As Justice O'Connor made clear, the case of Foucha v. Louisiana
does not require the Supreme Court "to pass judgment on more
narrowly drawn laws that provide for detention of insanity
acquittees, or on statutes that provide for punishment of persons
who commit crimes while mentally ill."158 Furthermore, she
pointed out that the Court's holding "places no new restriction on
the States' freedom to determine whether and to what extent mental
illness should excuse criminal behavior. The Court does not
indicate that States must make the insanity defense available."'59
Significantly, she observed: "If a State concludes that mental illness
is best considered in the context of criminal sentencing, the holding
in this case erects no bar to implementing that judgment."'"
Many mental health professionals will be appalled that nowhere
in the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, or
the separate dissenting opinions of Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
is there any reference to the inappropriate and overwhelming
burden imposed on hospital personnel by the court-ordered
retention in psychiatric hospitals of acquittees who are not mentally
ill. The Supreme Court, in general, while conveniently expressing
deference to medical opinion, are obviously utterly insensitive to,
if not contemptuous of, the time-honored ethical principle of the
medical profession:

156. Id
157. See id at 1786-87. The Court explained:
[l]f
Foucha committed criminal acts while at Feliciana, such as assault, the State does not
explain why its interest would not be vindicated by the ordinary criminal processes
involving charge and conviction, the use of enhanced sentences for recidivists, and other
permissible ways of dealing with patterns of criminal conduct. These are the normal
means of dealing with persistent criminal conduct. Had they been employed against
Foucha when he assaulted other inmates, there is little doubt that if then sane he could

have been convicted and incarcerated in the usual way.
Id
158. Id at 1789 (O'Connor, L,concurring).
159.

Id at 1790 (emphasis added).

160. Id
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A doctor must have complete clinical independence in deciding upon
the care of a person for whom he or she is medically responsible. The
doctor's fundamental role is to alleviate the distress of his or her fellow
men, and no motive--whether personal, collective or political--shall
prevail against this higher purpose.""

By forcing medical personnel to continue to treat "cured" patients,
the ethical principle of clinical independence has surely been
violated. As is often the case, the ethics of the medical profession
and the interests of the acquittee have been overpowered by the
punitive goals of the criminal justice system.
VII. "DUAL STATUS OFFENDERS"
The increasing utilization of the "split verdict" approach is yet
another example of the punitive trend in the administration of
criminal justice.162 This recently conceived mechanism pertains
to cases in which the defendant is found guilty of one crime and
"not guilty by reason of insanity" of another crime, the crimes
having been committed during the same period of time. The
defendant receives the worst of all alternatives, for now he is
pronounced both insane and a criminal.163 In such cases, the
prosecution attempts to show that some of the crimes are not the
result of mental disease or defect, at the same time allowing the
insanity issue to stand for other crimes. The defendant, after he is
released from a hospital for the criminally insane, is sent to prison
to serve the sentence for the crime of which he was found guilty.
Recent cases of this nature include a defendant who was found
not guilty by reason of insanity for killing his former wife, and
guilty of murder for killing her male companion, her daughter and
her mother. 16 Another case is that of a Maryland woman who
was acquitted of murder by reason of insanity, but was found guilty

161.

WORLD MEDIcAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF TOKYO Principle 4 (Oct. 1975).

162.

See Bill C-30, The House of Commons of Canada § 672.1 (2d reading Oct. 4, 1991); C.R.

JEFFERY, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL DISEASE 89 (1967).

163. JEFFERY, supra note 162, at 89.
164. Convicted Killer of 4 Faces Death Penalty, DAILY TIMES, June 29, 1984, at A7
(Mamaroneck, N.Y.).
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of involuntary manslaughter and child abuse.' 65 Her sentence to
ten-year terms in the custody of the Division of Correction was
approved by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 166 In
Ohio, a jury found a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity of
two rapes, but guilty of a third rape, gross sexual imposition, a
kidnapping, and a robbery, all of which arose out of a continuum
of events in the course of one night.'6 7 In Illinois, a defendant
was found guilty of two counts of felonious assault, and not guilty
by reason of insanity of three other counts of felonious assault and
two counts of aggravated burglary. 168 The court of appeals
rejected the defendant's argument that his conduct constituted one
continuous series of actions and that his conduct failed to
demonstrate that he was sane for one brief period and insane for
the rest of his criminal activity. 169 The conviction and sentence
17
were affirmed. 1
Mental health professionals necessarily see such dual status
offenders as having been just as insane (mentally ill) at the time
when they committed the crimes for which they were convicted as
at the time when they committed the crimes for which they were
found not guilty by reason of insanity (in every case within the
same period of hours or minutes). The treating personnel in such
instances often see their efforts as wasted, having succeeded only
in converting their hospitalized innocent patients to imprisoned
guilty convicts. This situation is analogous to that in which mental
health professionals are required to treat severely mentally ill
convicts who had been sentenced to death so that they can become
mentally competent to be executed.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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Robey v. State, 456 A.2d 953, 953 (Md. 1983).
Id at 954.
State v. Brown, 465 N.E.2d 889, 889-890 (Ohio 1984).
State v. Ware, 542 N.E.2d 1115, 1115 (Ohio 1988).
Id at 1117.
Id at 1119.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The time has long since passed when we should have realized
that abandonment of the insanity defense was required by logic and
rationality. It is recognized by many that a variety of personality
disorders, principally psychopathic personality disorder, warrant the
designation of serious mental illness rising, in a significant
proportion of lawbreakers, to the level of inability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct at the time the offense was
committed. Modem treatment of clear-cut psychotic illnesses has,
to a marked degree, reduced the potential dangerousness of some
affected individuals, and in others it has allowed an underlying
personality disorder to come to the fore. The result has been an
ever-increasing number of people inappropriately detained in
mental hospitals, under court or special security review board
orders, with the concomitant misuse and abuse of the mental health
professions.
The insanity defense has thus far been legislatively abolished
in three states.171 These statutes reject mental condition as a
separate specific defense to a criminal charge, but expressly
permitted expert evidence of mental illness or disability to be
presented at trial.1 72 This evidence would not be in support of an
independent insanity defense, but rather would permit the accused
to rebut the state's evidence offered to prove that the defendant had
the requisite criminal intent or mens rea required to commit the
crime charged. The supreme courts of Montana and Idaho have
both held that there is no independent constitutional right to plead
insanity, and that abolition of the insanity defense neither deprives
a defendant of his Fourth Amendment right to due process nor
violates the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. 3

171. 1979 MONTANA LAws ch. 714; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-207 (Supp. 1986).
172. 1979 MONTANA LAws ch. 714; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-207 (Supp. 1986).
173. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 918
(Idaho 1990).
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We must now actively challenge the oft-repeated platitudes of
prominent legal scholars, jurists and psychiatrists, whose
pronouncements have given an aura of professional sanction and
encouragement to repressive and punitive state and federal
legislation in recent years."' 4 I have, elsewhere, suggested steps
for the rational and humane handling of mentally disordered
offenders175 and of ordinarily law-abiding and honest persons

who have committed unlawful acts in circumstances in which their
mental and emotional processes or behavioral controls were

174. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (1945), ("Our collective
conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame."); Sinclair v. State, 132 So.
581, 589 (1931) (Griffith, J., concurring) ("[H]ow can a Legislature change into guilt that which
under the supreme law of nature is not guilt, or punish as a crime, that which nature proclaims is not
a crime?"); HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 255-66 (1982)
(statement of Richard Bonnie); Myths & Realities: Hearing Transcriptof the National Commission
on the Insanity Defense Before the NationalAssociation of Mental Health 91-97 (1983) (statement
of Loren H. Roth); David Bazelon, The Insanity Defense: Symbol and Substance, 9 NEWSL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., 3, 5 (1984) ("The insanity defense is integral to the moral foundation of
the criminal law. It is our nemesis, and it is our hope."); Richard Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the
Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 194 (1983); Loren Roth, Preserve But Limit the Insanity Defense,
58 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 91, 95 (1986-87) (arguing that the insanity defense is essential to the moral
integrity of the criminal law); John Keenan, Commentary, 24 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N B. NEWS 5, 7 (1982)
("Abolishing the insanity defense flies directly in the face of our legal traditions and history. It is not
a solution but rather is the approach that might better be taken in a police state. The approach would
offend the community's sense of propriety."); Ralph Slovenko, The Meaning of Mental Illness in
CriminalResponsibility, 5 J. LE AL MED. 1, 60 (1984) (stating that it is textbook learning that the
insanity defense is essential to the moral integrity of the criminal law); Alan Stone, The Insanity
Defense on Trial, 33 Hosp. & CoMMuNITy PSYCHIATRY 636, 640 (1982) ("The insanity defense is
the exception that proves the rule of free will. It demonstrates that all other criminals have free will,
the ability to choose between good and evil."); John Leo, Is the System Guilty? A Stunning Verdict
Putsthe Insanity Defense On Trial, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26 (quoting psychologist Emanuel Tanay
as stating "we need the insanity defense so we can say we are a civilized society and we don't
execute sick people."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Insanity Laws Seen as Hurting Society, NEW YORK TIMs,
July 1, 1982, at A15 (quoting Jonas Rappeport as stating that 'It]he insanity plea is necessary to
maintain our view of a moral justice. In one form or another, it has served mankind successfully for
thousands of years. In a sense, it is the mark that separates us from the wild beasts. We cannot hold
culpable those who were incapable of being morally wrong. Infants, the retarded and severely
mentally ill defendants, deserve this protection from the harshness of the law"); see also Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 255-66 (1982) (statement of Jonas
Rappeport).
175. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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functioning in such a manner that they should justly be
acquitted. 76
In particular, it is high time that our society adopted procedures
first recommended over sixty years ago by the American Medical
Association, American Bar Association, American Psychiatric
Association and American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology. 177 These reform proposals include:
1. That there be available in every criminal and juvenile
court a psychiatric service to assist the court in the
disposition of offenders.
2. That the disposition and treatment (including
punishment) be based on a study of the individual
offender by properly qualified and impartial experts,
cooperating with the courts.
3. That the indeterminate sentence system be extended to
all types of criminal cases involving prison sentences,
thus making more efficient the individualization of
treatment.
4. That there be a psychiatric service available to every
penal and correctional institution.

176. See Abraham Halpern, Uncloseting the Conscience of the Jury: A Justly Acquitted
Doctrine, 52 PsycHIATRic Q. 144, 155 (1980); see also William Camahan, Changing the Insanity
Defense, in THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK-A REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L CAREY, NEW

YORK STATE DEPARTmENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE 131, 141 (Feb. 11, 1978). Likewise, Carnahan has
shown that virtually all defendants who successfully used the insanity defense during a ten-year study
period in New York State would have been candidates for conviction under a diminished capacity
rule, had the insanity defense not been available to them. Id. The insanity defense, with its
exculpation sans freedom, forcing the psychiatrist "to assume the role of post-acquittal custodian,"
would give way to conviction "for lesser included criminal offense not requiring an accused to have
acted either intentionally or knowingly." Il The ensuing "culpability" would enable the sentencing
court to "take the present mental condition of the offender into account in determining an appropriate
disposition, namely, conditional discharge, probation or penal confimement." Id.
177. See generally ALBERT DEmUScH, THE MENTALLY ILL INAMERICA 416-17 (1949); KARL
MENNiNOER, THE CRIME OF PUNIsHMENT 122 (1966); Ralph Slovenko, A History of Criminal
Proceduresas Related to Mental Disorders,55 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 223, 245 (1968).
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5. That there be established in each state a complete
system of administrative transfer and parole, and that
there be no decision for or against any parole, or
transfer from one institution to another, without a
psychiatric report.
Automatic post-acquittal confinement, almost invariably
associated with a verdict of not guilty or not responsible by reason
of insanity, has for many acquittees been nothing more than
punishment in disguise. Replacement of the insanity defense by
statutes that provide for expert witness testimony to show that the
defendant lacked the state of mind required as an element of the
offense charged, has been found by two state supreme courts to be
in accord with constitutional requirements. Procedures can be
implemented, with due regard for public safety, so that all
offenders, mentally disordered or otherwise, may be dealt with in
an ethical, effective, and humane manner.
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